Revealing Foundational Preconceptions

Within Federalist # 10, James Madison, a founding father wrote, “The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have… been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished.” Thus he introduced the essential discussion on determining a delicate balance in representing majorities, minorities and their special interests. Madison presents the critical issue of factions within a government that destroy the establishment’s unity and life. While Madison displays grave concern over factions, his proposed cure conveys a paradox, while factions are harmful, government cannot seek to eliminate liberty or diversity in society. Instead, Madison advocates for the republican structure of electing specific officials within a nation covering a large sphere of influence to mitigate and filter division. Such a perspective emerges from a specific definition of man and a desire to control the effects of human tendency. To further examine the issue the paper will present Madison’s explanation of the matter and the underlying beliefs prompting a republican based solution.

While presenting a defense for the newly authored Constitution, James Madison addressed the the issue of “factions” and the plausible solutions offered through the proposed form of government. He begins saying, “AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.” Within the first sentence, he boasts of a Union capable of dealing with conflicting interests within a nation. Complaints had arisen that, “the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,” all because of, “a factious spirit.” The founding father defined a faction as a group of citizens joined by an interest which counters the rights or desires of other citizens. Taking the time to author an essay on the topic indicates the importance of “factions” within the colonial society. While some might argue a plurality of voices is a healthy occurrence, Madison approaches the topic using phrases like “violence of faction.” Clearly, factions are something with destructive force. In describing the origins and effects of divided groups in man, our founding father writes, “A zeal for different opinions…rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.” In other words, the result of differing views was not only a verbal declaration of difference but also was carried into action and targeted against other members of society. Thus Madison displays an apprehensive and negative attitude toward factions or groups whose interests cause conflict within a society.

In considering the stated problem, Madison proposed, analyzed and debunked two possible solutions demonstrating a respect for liberty and diversity along with a desire for a self-maintaining society. First, a government may squelch liberty and thereby stamp out conflicting voices; yet, Madison argues such a solution is “worse than the disease” for liberty remains a productive spirit despite some drawbacks. Secondly, the opinion of the mass may be induced into uniformity; however, Madison counters the idea writing, “the protection of these faculties [differing abilities] is the first object of government.” With the latter statement, Madison makes a distinct claim for diversity’s protection.

When Madison describes a societal feature as holding, “Diversity in the faculties of men,” he linked those capacities with the right to own property. Thus, his meaning by the term “faculties” refers to the ability of each individual which in turn affects their ability to acquire material possessions. The writer makes this connection saying, “From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different … kinds of property immediately results.” His meaning is the following: when government protects the diversity in ability to make a living, people will gain unique types of wealth. From the illiterate serving as an indentured servant to the savvy businessman accumulating funds upon funds, man’s intellectual and physical capacities differ. Madison then argues such differentiation in distribution engenders the conflicting interests within a society. He continued the latter quote saying, “from the influence of these [different kinds of property] on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests.” The unequal division of talent amongst the people brings divergent levels of economic wellbeing affecting the areas of concern of each person. This is historically illustrated in the Northern and Southern conflict over the Protective Tariff; the Northern industries received economic protection while the South suffered monetarily as they depended upon exports to England. Their unique capacities at certain industries affected their monetary concerns and therefore instigated clashing interests. Madison’s surprising answer to what might appear the source of the problem is to protect the range of capacities, indeed in his mind it was government’s “first object” or primary goal.

While modern thinkers might wonder why Madison does not advocate equating the conditions of each citizen to thus eliminate collision of interests, our founding father plainly indicates the foundation for his perspective. After stating what government’s primary goal consisted off, he makes the following statement, “the latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man.” What could “nature of man” mean? Earlier he maintained, “that as long as the reason of man continues fallible…different opinions will be formed”; consequently, factions which are different opinions emerge from man’s “fallible” “ reason.” Thus man’s nature is fallible, his very mind is limited and capable of error. Here lies the root of societal issues. Madison states man has a “strong” “propensity” to “’fall into mutual animosities”: the reason resides in his fallen nature. Societal structures and circumstances only serve to instigate “the human passions”. It is in the inner depraved, or sin nature of man that such passions arise. Based on Madison’s definition of man, he does not suggest equalizing property amongst citizens. Further into his article, he offers a historical assessment which sheds light. In analyzing the foundational error in a democracy’s theoretical principles, he writes, “theoretic politicians…have supposed that by reducing mankind to perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.” Commenting on democracy as a system of government, he critiques the founding theory behind it, that men granted equal political power would then develop the same material possessions and develop the same opinions and desires. Seen in the reverse, equality in political rights and possessions do not equalize opinions or passions. There will always be a drive for more, always a different bent and interest in each person. These interests emerged from a fallible reason. Based on these presuppositions, our founding father determined government could only hope to “control” factions’ “effects” instead of removing its causes. While knowing liberty combined with human nature could destroy a country, Madison respected liberty’s preservation and advocated for a governmental structure that would curtail human nature but allow for diversity of opinion.

Having identified the problem of factions, their origins and the type of government required to control the natural display of human nature, James Madison presents a republican “cure” to maintain the, “public good and private rights” and, “preserve the spirit and form of good government.” The fix originated in the government’s very structure: small, elected, representative group presiding over a large geographic region. He contrast his ideas to a democracy where a “society consist[ed] of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.” Such a government configuration naturally lends to a majority, possesses, “nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party,” and thus proves, “incompatible with personal security or the rights of property.” Madison held no sympathy for a democratic government; for it lacked intermediaries who could look out for a minority’s rights and uphold a respect for diversity and the differing capacities to gain property. In the proposed Constitution, a group of elected officials would mediate public opinion and decide in the nation’s best interest. These would, “refine and enlarge the public views” and through “wisdom” and “patriotism and love of justice” settle choices unhindered by impassioned or temporary impulses. Given man’s fallible reason an tendency to seek his own good, qualified statesmen were needed to mediate between divergent viewpoints. However, even with such a structure, the founding father highlights a drawback: elected officials’ corruptibility. “Men of factitious tempers…or of sinister designs” could “betray the interests of the people”; consequently, Madison argues for a “large republic” where physical distance and larger pools of qualified citizens would assist to deter local corruption. When representatives seek votes from a large region, they must reach out to the whole. This should prevent local interests and personal bargains from determining a candidate. Additionally, selecting from a larger realm allows a larger number of competent candidates to rise. A larger voting district should help prevent corrupt local elections: “as each representative will be chosen by a larger number of citizens in the large [republic]…it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried.” A larger geographic area offers a multiplicity of people with diverse vocations, stations in life and viewpoints. Such diversity forces a candidate to highlight aspects of moral character over a stance on specific issues. Being dependent upon a wide range of voters to win, the person cannot be closely linked to one interest group. Thus Madison advocates a system to filter out the impulses of natural man and prevent corruption.

With the combination of instituting elected representatives within a large dominion, Madison proposed a republican solution to issues arising in republican governments. The solution was republican in form as defined in Classic Republicanism where specific individuals engage in civic virtue for the good of the whole. He asserts the ability for protection from divisive undercurrents, “is supplied by the republican principle which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.” Thus the system possessed the ability to counter negative groups through voting. His model instituted a cure to typical republics in proposing dominion over a larger geographic area encompassing more people. In comparing small and large republics he asks if, “small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians” and decides in “favor of the latter.” Madison argues in favor of large republics because it added a safeguard against corruption as previously discussed. Hence Madison argues for a republican model designed for a sizeable nation offering a unique design against division.

To conclude, our founding father’s proposed solution for factions revealed a fundamental preconception about mankind, a deep respect for human diversity and concern to maintain an orderly liberty. Madison perceived the danger factions posed to unity and examined possible resolutions to represent each opinion while maintaining order. Division emerged from man’s fallen reason and unequal capacities. Both combined to produce conflicting interests. While Madison could have suggested crushing liberty to express unique ideas and desires or propose equating each citizen’s material situation, he denounces such approaches and proposes a “republican cure.” The republican model centered upon selecting specific statesmen to represent and filter public opinion; to counter corruption, the government would govern over a large domain and thus prevent local corruption. Madison’s proposal demonstrates an understanding and conviction about human depravity balanced with a respect for liberty. Thus a unique paradoxical set of convictions, foundational preconceptions, prompted and directed our founding father as he authored a republican government model with a “twist”.



References
Madison, James. “Federalist # 10.” Daily Advertiser, November 22, 1787.
Neem, Johann. The American Republic. Lecture, Bellingham, WA: Western Washington
University, January 2010.